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Abstract: Public community Mobile Ad Hoc NETworks (MANETs), such as
the “Funkfeuer” or “Freifunk” networks, scale up to several hundreds of routers,
connecting users with each other, and with the Internet. As MANETs are
typically operated over wireless channels (e.g. WiFi), access to these networks
is granted to anyone in the radio range of another router in the MANET, and
running the same MANET routing protocol. In order to protect the stability
of the networks from malicious intruders, it is important to ensure that only
trusted peers are admitted to participate in the control message exchange, and
to provide means for logically “disconnecting” a non-trustworthy peer.
This memorandum presents the concept of admittance control for the Opti-
mized Link State Routing Protocol version 2 (OLSRv2), and suggests a security
extension based on digital signatures. Due to the flexible message format of OL-
SRv2, this extension keeps compatibility with the core OLSRv2 specification.
Several standard digital signature algorithms (RSA, DSA, ECDSA), as well as
HMAC, are compared in terms of message overhead and CPU time for generat-
ing and processing signatures.
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the Optimized Link State Routing Protocol
version 2
Re´sume´ : Les communaute´s publiques de re´seaux ad-hoc mobiles (ou MANETs),
tels que les re´seaux “Funkfeur” ou “Freifunk”, ont atteint une taille de plusieurs
centaines de routeurs, permettant ainsi une interconnexion entre leurs nombreux
utilisateurs mais aussi avec Internet. La plupart des MANETs sont de´ploye´s
au travers d’un re´seau sans fil (p.ex. le WIFI), permettant ainsi quiconque
pre´sent dans la zone de couverture d’un des routeurs, et connaissant le proto-
cole de routage du re´seau, de s’y connecter. Pour garantir l’inte´grite´ du re´seau
face de tels intrus malintentionne´s, il est important de s’assurer que seuls des
clients duˆment authentifie´s sont admis participer aux e´changes des messages de
contrles ainsi que de fournir un moyen de “de´connecter” un client non-authentifie´
du re´seau.
Dans ce document, nous pre´sentons le concept de contrle d’accs pour la
deuxime version du protocole de routage Optimized Link State (OLSRv2) ainsi
qu’une extension de sa suˆrete´ graˆce des signatures digitales. La souplesse du
format des messages utilise´s par OLSRv2 permet cette extension de rester
compatible avec sa spe´cification initiale. Nous pre´senterons un comparatif entre
plusieurs algorithmes de signatures traditionnels (RSA, DSA, ECDSA) ainsi
qu’avec HMAC, en s’inte´ressant principalement la quantite´ de messages envoye´s
et au temps processeur utilise´ pour la cre´ation et l’analyse des signatures.
Mots-cle´s : Security, OLSR, OLSRv2, MANET, ECC
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1 Introduction
Network integrity in routed networks is largely preserved by physically control-
ling access to the communications channel between routers: know thy peers,
trust thy peers — and be able to disconnect thy peers if they are not worthy
of the trust, e.g. if the topology they present does not match expectations.
Routing integrity is thus protected by admitting only trusted peers, assuming
that these, once admitted, are well behaving.
In a MANET (Mobile Ad hoc NETwork), often operated over wireless inter-
faces, this is less obvious: physical access to the media between routers is not
delimited by a cable, but is available to anyone within transmission range; the
network topology is time-varying, either due to router mobility or due to time-
varying characteristics of the channel – consequently, determining that a peer
does not present an “expected topology” and subsequently “disconnecting” it
is difficult. As such, MANETs do not introduce particularly new security issues
for routing protocols, but rather render existing security issues easier to ex-
ploit and, therefore, require re-examining counter-measures for routing protocol
resilience.
1.1 OLSRv2 Overview
The Optimized Link State Routing Protocol version 2 [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] is the suc-
cessor of the widely used OLSR [6] routing protocol for MANETs. A proactive
link state protocol, OLSRv2 retains the same basic algorithms as its predeces-
sor, but offers various improvements, e.g. a modular and flexible architecture
allowing extensions to be developed as add-ons to the basic protocol.
OLSRv2 contains three basic processes: Neighborhood Discovery, Link State
Advertisement and MPR Flooding. Neighbor Discovery and Link State Ad-
vertisement manifest themselves through HELLO and TC messages, generated
periodically. HELLOs and TCs, both, advertise links between the router gen-
erating the message and (a subset of) its neighbors – possibly also indicating
additional information pertaining to each such link. HELLOs are used for de-
tecting bi-directionality of links, and list all neighbors, each associated with
a status flag (HEARD, SYM). HELLOs are exchanged only with direct neigh-
bors. TCs are used for sharing link-state information network-wide, and list only
neighbors with which a symmetric link has been identified (by the Neighborhood
Discovery process). TCs include a sequence number, used to allow recipients
to exclude outdated information, incremented when the set of advertised links
changes. TCs are delivered through the network using MPR Flooding.
MPR flooding is a process for each router to efficiently perform network-
wide broadcasts. Each router designates, a subset (MPR set) from among the
neighbors with which a bi-directional link has been identified, such that a mes-
sage transmitted by the router and relayed by the MPR set is received by all
its 2-hop neighbors. MPR selection is signaled by a router by associating a
flag (MPR) to the selected neighbors in outgoing HELLOs. The set of routers
having selected a given router as MPR is the MPR-selector-set of that router.
A study of the MPR flooding algorithm can be found in [7].
MPR selection further serves to allow designation of which links are to be
included in TC messages: a router must (at least) include links to all its MPR-
selector-set. Thus, the schematic operation of OLSRv2 is illustrated in figure 1.
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a b d
a: HELLO (b=MPR)
b: TC (b-a)
c
b: HELLO (c=MPR)
X
Figure 1: Basic OLSRv2 Operation
1.2 OLSRv2 Security Problem Statement
Correct operation of OLSRv2 assumes that each router is able to acquire a
consistent topology map, reflecting the effective network topology. In OLSRv2,
this implies that: (i) the links designated by HELLOs to be advertised in TCs
reflect actual links in the network; (ii) that the TCs advertise these actual links;
and (iii) that TCs are correctly relayed, i.e. that the MPR flooding process
operates correctly.
In figure 1, router a selects b as MPR in order to cover c. b, therefore,
advertises the link b-a in TCs. If a, in its HELLOs, “pretends to be” (spoofs
the identity of) d, then b will instead advertise the link b-d. If b spoofs the
identity of d when generating TCs, the link d-a is advertised. As neither b-d
nor d-a exist in the network, this will cause incorrect topology maps in routers
– with potential consequences including routing loops, parts of the network
being disconnected or traffic to the same destination from different parts of the
network terminating in different routers [8]. If a malicious router, X (gray circle)
is a neighbor of a and spoofs the identity of c (more generally, of all neighbors of
b), then a will not select b as MPR. This has as consequences that (i) b will not
advertise b-a; and (ii) the MPR flooding process is disrupted: TCs transiting
through a will not be relayed by b to reach the right-hand side of the network.
Symmetric attacks exist by instead of spoofing the identity of itself, a router
spoofs the identity of its neighbors – i.e spoofs links in the network: e.g., if b
sends TCs advertising a link b-d without having a neighbor spoofing the identity
of d, this will have similar effects.
1.3 Paper Outline
The remainder of this memorandum is organized as follows: section 2 presents
the general idea of “admittance control” in OLSRv2, allowing a router to em-
ploy cryptographic signatures to detect, and take proper actions, against iden-
tity spoofing. Section 3 expresses this in terms of an extension to OLSRv2,
and section 4 studies the performance of an OLSRv2 network when using this
extension and with various cryptographic algorithms. [9] states “The energy
cost of transmitting 1Kb a distance of 100 meters is approximately 3 joules. By
contrast, a general-purpose processor with 100MIPS/W power could efficiency
execute 3 million instructions for the same amount of energy”, indicating that
shorter (but more computationally intensive) signatures for certain applications,
INRIA
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such as energy constrained devices, may be preferential. This memorandum ,
therefore, in place of the usual network performance metrics (overhead, band-
width, ...) studies per-message processing overhead, both for when generating
and receiving messages. The memorandum is concluded in section 5.
2 Admittance Control
The objective in this memorandum is to provide a mechanism, akin to that which
is employed in “classic” routed networks as described in 1: a way of ensuring that
only trusted peers are admitted to participate in the control message exchange
between routers – and, thus, also a way for a router to logically “disconnect”
a non-trustworthy peer. Absent the ability to physically control access to the
channel between routers, the mechanism employs logical “admittance control”
by including cryptographic signatures in control messages (HELLO and TCs),
and requires their verification prior to accepting a control message for processing
or forwarding.
Verification of a cryptographic signature, associated with a control message,
allows the recipient to assert that (i) the control message has not been altered
while in transit and (ii) the originator of the control message is in possession of
a cryptographic key for generating a valid signature. Concerning (ii), a crypto-
graphic algorithm employing symmetric shared keys supports simple discrimina-
tion between “trusted” and “untrusted” routers. Employing asymmetric keys
enables discrimination between individual trusted routers, thus prohibiting a
“trusted router” from spoofing the identity of another router (trusted or not)
in the network.
Associating signatures with control messages is not without effect on network
performance: generation and verification of signatures incurs a computational
overhead in each router, and inclusion of signatures in control messages increase
the number of bits to transmit over the wireless interface. These effects are, for
a selection of cryptographic algorithms, quantified in this memorandum .
2.1 Resilience Evaluation
The admittance control mechanism enables routers to determine if a received
control message originates from a “trusted router”, discarding information re-
ceived from non-trusted routers. This leaves two remaining vulnerabilities un-
covered: (i) recording control traffic from a “trusted router” for later replaying
(possibly elsewhere in the network) and (ii) trusted routers misbehaving, e.g.
by spoofing links.
For (i), a countermeasure in the form of synchronized time-stamps can be
employed, included in each control message; for (ii), inclusion of signatures for
both ends of an advertised link can be considered. Synchronized time-stamps
and per-link signatures are, however, the subject for a subsequent article.
3 Specification
Introducing admittance control to OLSRv2 requires specification of (i) a way
of associating signatures to control messages and (ii) the necessary processing
for generating and verifying signatures (and, appropriate actions to take in case
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verification fails). Compared to its predecessor, OLSRv2 facilitates this through
the use of [2] as packet and message format, and through explicit ”hooks” in [4, 5]
for recognizing external reasons for rejecting a message as malformed.
3.1 Signature TLV Structure
[2] enables a generic way for protocol extensions to add information to control
messages by way of inclusion Type-Length-Value (TLV) objects. Thus, a se-
curity extension can associate a signature to a HELLO or TC by including a
“Signature TLV” in the control message:
<sign-tlv> := <hash-fkt><sign_algo><sign>
where: <hash-fkt> and <sign_algo> identify the choice of hash function and
signature algorithm, respectively, and <sign> contains the digital signature,
calculated thus:
sign = sign_algo(hash-fkt(message))
Verification of a message is a boolean operation, acting as a black-box for the
routing protocol and returning true if the message signature verifies, false oth-
erwise:
verified = verif(message, <sign-tlv>)
3.2 Message Generation and Processing
As enabled by [4, 5], subsequent to the usual HELLO and TC generation,
outgoing messages are signed and a <sign-tlv> included. Upon receipt of
a HELLO or TC, a message is identified as malformed and, thus, not processed,
if verif(...) for that message returns false. For TC messages, per-hop mu-
table fields (hop-count and hop-limit) are set to 0 for calculating <sign> and
verif(...).
Note that due to the packet and message format of OLSRv2 [2], using this
signature extension keeps compatibility with the “core” OLSRv2 specification.
A router, that uses OLSRv2 without the extension, does not know the TLV
type and will consequently ignore the information contained in these TLVs. It
it thus able to correctly process signed control messages, however, its HELLOs
and TCs will be rejected by all routers applying the security extension, since
the messages are not signed.
4 Performance Study
Introduction of signatures provides a measure of “admittance control” to OL-
SRv2 – at the expense of increased control message sizes and per-message-
generation/processing overhead, dependent on the cryptographic algorithms
employed. This additional overhead is quantified by way of NS2 simulations,
using with a selection of cryptographic algorithms: RSA-1024, DSA-1024 and
ECDSA-160. The signature-lengths in these algorithms have been chosen so as
to provide similar resilience against attacks, with an 80-bit security level [10].
INRIA
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Crypto Generation time Processing time Overhead
ECDSA-160 2.11 ms 3.73 ms 42 bytes
DSA-1024 2.78 ms 5.26 ms 46.31 bytes
RSA-1024 4.84 ms 0.33 ms 128 bytes
HMAC-80 0.07 ms 0.04 ms 20 bytes
Table 1: Simulation Results: per-message generation/ processing time and over-
head
RSA [11], DSA [12] and ECDSA [13] employ asymmetric keys, i.e. permit
by verification of the signature to also verify the identity of the router gener-
ating the message. For comparison, the symmetric HMAC-801[14] algorithm is
also included. The results presented in this section are all normalized wrt. OL-
SRv2, i.e. only the additional overhead incurring from the security extension is
depicted.
Simulations have been conducted using JOLSRv2 [15] using relatively stan-
dard scenario parameters (1km2 square, 100m segments of random walk at 2-
8m
s
, 0-5s pause-time and 5 concurrent CBR streams of 3.2kb/s). The number
of routers was varied between 10 and 50, and each value has been averaged over
15 simulation runs.
In addition to the additional control traffic overhead, the in-router mes-
sage generation/processing overhead has also been measured. JOLSRv2 uses
AgentJ [16] for interfacing with NS2. AgentJ/NS2 permits a single thread ex-
ecution at a time, without preemption, thereby allowing instrumenting the sig-
nature generation and verification code to record the time spent on each such
operation2. For the simulations, an Intel Core 2 CPU with 2.1 GHz and 4 GB
of RAM was used.
4.1 Simulation Results
Table 1 summarizes the average measured time for generating and processing
control messages, as well as the average overhead, incurred by each of the four
signature processes. For OLSRv2 without signatures, these values would all be
zero.
As a first observation, HMAC-80 requires significantly less time than ECDSA,
DSA and RSA for generating a message signature. For verification of a mes-
sage signature, HMAC likewise spends substantially less time than ECDSA and
DSA, whereas RSA is close to HMAC in the time it requires for a verification.
Verification of RSA signatures is faster than both ECDSA and DSA, however
with much greater overhead as well. These figures are hardly surprising; the
characteristics of the various signature algorithms are well-known [12].
Figure 2 depicts the cumulative time each router spends, over the duration
of 100 seconds, on generating message signatures in JOLSRv2. As the number
1Note that HMAC, strictly speaking, is not a signature algorithm, but a Message Authen-
tication Code. As such, it does not offer per-principal authentication nor non-repudiation. In
the rest of the memorandum , we will not make this distinction and will abusively refer to
HMAC as a signature method.
2For completeness: AgentJ rewrites System.currentTimeMillis() such as to return the
“simulator time”, whereas System.nanoTime() is not rewritten and therefore returns the “wall
clock time”.
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of routers grow in the network, so does the time each router spends in total on
generating signatures. The reason for this is, that OLSRv2 enables “triggered
message generation”, i.e. that message generation may result from some exter-
nal event, in addition to periodical messages. Thus, with more routers being
present in the network, more links are detected as appearing/disappearing –
and therefore more messages, and corresponding signatures, are generated.
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 10  20  30  40  50
m
s
Number of routers
ECDSA-160
DSA-1024
RSA-1024
HMAC-80
Figure 2: Cumulative time per router spent on generating message signatures.
The corresponding cumulative processing time in each router is depicted in
figure 3. Each router generates HELLOs, which must be processed by its neigh-
bors. Thus, increasing the network density increases the number of HELLOs
that a given router receives and, therefore, the number of signatures to verify.
Depending on the network topology and MPR selection, additional routers may
also incur additional TCs, whose processing and signature verification is to be
conducted by each other router in the network. Finally, as indicated above,
triggered messages as more links appear/disappear in the network also cause
more messages with signatures to verify.
A couple of general observations can be made concerning the results. While
HMAC and RSA do not need a significant amount of time for signature ver-
ification, ECDSA routers spend almost 8% of their time verifying signatures,
while DSA spends more than 10%. This might still appear reasonable – but
it has to be kept in mind that the simulation was performed on relatively fast
hardware3, whereas devices in an OLSRv2 network may be far less powerful
than that, such as smartphones or even sensors. Thus, one might be tempted
to use RSA signatures if CPU ressources is the primary concern and ECDSA
otherwise. That said, ECDSA scales better than RSA (e.g., increasing from
80-bit security level to 128-bit level will lengthen ECDSA keys by about 40%
and RSA keys by 200%), which should be taken into account when elevating
the security level.
3Albeit using the less than optimal Java multi-precision arithmetic.
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Figure 3: Cumulative time per router spent on verifying message signatures.
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Figure 4: Total overhead incurring due to signature inclusion.
Figure 4 depicts the cumulative overhead in the network, due to the inclusion
of message signatures. Intuitively, as the per-message overhead is constant, the
cumulative overhead would be a function of the number of control messages –
itself a function of simulation time and number of routers. That the curves
in figure 4 grow slightly faster than linearly with the number of routers is, as
stated previously, due to triggered messages.
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5 Conclusion
This memorandum has presented a general extension to OLSRv2 for provid-
ing “admittance control” in an OLSRv2 network: enabling admitting “trusted
routers” and excluding “non-trusted” routers from participating in the control
message exchange between routers, thereby providing a mode-of-operation of
an OLSRv2 network, similar to that which is otherwise employed for preserving
network integrity in routed networks.
A performance study of this extension is presented, quantifying the impact in
terms of increased control traffic overhead and increased per-message generation
and processing time. The signature algorithms used were RSA-1024, DSA-1024
and ECDSA-160 – chosen and parameterized in order to provide for comparable
resilience.
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